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Abstract
To explore offshore oil fields in deepwater, the use of a floating production storage and
offloading (FPSO) unit coupled to a shuttle tanker is economically and technically feasible.
Shuttle tankers like system for oil transportation are increasingly being accepted as a
preferred transportation method for remote and deepwater offshore developments. The
offloading operation is considered one of the riskiest operations in offshore environment.
The chapter presents a risk-based analysis method aiming at defining the risk profile
associated with an offloading operation. For offloading operations, the risk profile is
usually evaluated considering that the offloading operation has an approximate duration
of 24 hours. The method follows three basic steps: identification of hazard, definition of
failure scenarios and their probability of occurrence, and evaluation of failure conse-
quences. The decision-making theory is used to evaluate the possibility of emergency
disconnection during the operation. The method is applied to evaluate the risk profile of
an offloading operation in Campos Basin, Brazil, considering a FPSO moored with Differ-
entiated Complacent Anchoring System (DICAS). The method is used to model the risk
scenario associated with shuttle tanker main engine failure as initiating event. The
changes in environmental conditions have great influence in risk profile and increase the
probability of disconnection.
Keywords: probability risk assessment (PRA), risk profile, offloading operation,
Markovian process, Bayesian techniques
1. Introduction
The occurrence of accidents in complex systems, such as offshore and onshore oil and gas
processing plants, power plants, and chemical process industries, is financially expensive
because the accidents can cease plant operations and even can cause harm to people, property,
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and environment. For this reason, to identify vulnerable factors that become unacceptable
operating scenarios is a challenge in the risk assessment of complex systems. The risk assess-
ment seeks to minimize undesirable event probability and their impact both for the environ-
ment and for the people involved in the operations. The impact in the operation can be
measured as economic consequences based on the extension of equipment damage and on
reduction of plant performance.
The search for oil fields no longer occurs exclusively onshore, but includes the oceans of the
world. This fact has contributed to the development of rigs for drilling and production offshore
in deepwater.
The current method for crude oil export in deepwater is using floating production storage and
offloading (FPSO). The FPSO is a floating vessel, in that it is equipped with internal or external
turret, and equipment to refine crude oil, and storage capacity. Therefore, FPSO have an
offloading system to transfer the crude oil to shuttle tankers. As you can see in [1, 2], the
shuttle tankers are increasingly being accepted as a preferred transportation method for
remote and deepwater offshore developments, for example, according to ONIP (Programa
Nacional de Mobilização da Indústria Nacional do Petróleo e Gás Natural) in 2002, Brazil had
46.0% of the total oil production of Petrobras located in deepwater (400–1000 m) and 29.9% in
ultra-deepwater, with water depth greater than 1000 m [3]. More recently, shuttle tankers have
become the main way to distribute the crude oil produced offshore on Brazilian fields [4]. The
options for methods of offloading from a FPSO and shuttle tanker include remote single point
mooring, tandem offloading, and alongside configuration.
The tandem offloading operation is frequently a complex and difficult marine operation. FPSO
may rotate due to waves and wind actions, and this rotates according to the weather that
generates linear motions of a ship (surge, sway, and yaw). To stay connected for loading and at
the same time maintain a safe separation distance, shuttle tanker must position itself aligned
with the FPSO position. As we show in [5], the situation is dramatically changed in the tandem
offloading operation in terms of positioning complexity and damage potential [5], due to the
significant amount of mass involved (e.g., a 150,000-dwt shuttle tanker) in close distance to an
installation (FPSO) for a long period of time.
To analyze the nature of the incidents in maritime operations, it is necessary to define a
complex relationship among design procedures, equipment, environmental conditions, and
operational procedures. To gain a full understanding and comprehensive awareness of safety
in each situation, it is necessary to use a systemic approach to consider all the aspects that may
lead to hazardous events and to consider different uncertainty sources [6]. In complex system
safety assessment, a systemic approach means to consider all functional entities that constitute
the system, exploring patterns and inter-relationships within subsystems and seeing undesired
events as the products of the working of the system.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the most risk analysts have been trained in the “classical” approach
to risk analysis, where probability exists as a quantity characterizing the failure of the system
being studied and independent of the analyst. This concept of probability is frequency based,
and the results of the risk analyses provide estimates of these “true” probabilities. For operations
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involving complex nonlinearities and multicomponent system, especially, new techniques for
risk analysis upon of abnormal event are needed. The quantification of risk cannot be handled
with traditional statistical methods since it requires the quantification of the probability of
accidental events that in most cases are rare [7].
The incidents in maritime operations often involve the analysis of low-probability events for
which few data are available. Classical statistical methods are inefficient in these cases. Bayes-
ian techniques are useful because of their ability to deal with sparse data and to incorporate a
wide variety of information gained based on expert judgment. A further practical advantage of
the subjective probability framework in risk assessment applications is that propagation of
uncertainties through complex models is relatively simple.
In the last few decades, has been several studies examined trends about Bayesian techniques
in risk assessment [7–13], such as those presented by Avan and Kvaloy [7] discussing some
of the practical challenges of implementing Bayesian thinking and methods in risk analysis,
emphasizing the introduction of probability models and parameters and associated uncer-
tainty assessments. Siu and Kelly [8] present a tutorial on Bayesian parameter estimation
especially relevant to probability risk assessment. Jun et al. [9] divide the system failure
mode based on the criticality analysis using multistage event tree. They predict failure rates
and the time to failures and consequently can predict the system reliability. Eleye-Datubo
et al. [10] show in a marine evacuation scenario and that of authorized vessels to floating,
production, storage, and offloading collision, based on a commercial computer tool. Meel
and Seider [11] developed Bayesian model to predict the number of abnormal events in the
next time interval utilizing information from previous intervals and determine fuzzy mem-
berships to various critical zones to indicate the proximity of abnormal events to incipient
faults, near misses, incidents, and accidents. Kalantarnia et al. [12], for example, use Bayes-
ian theory to update the likelihood of the event occurrence and failure probability of the
safety system and hence develop a dynamic failure assessment for a process. Yun et al. [13]
use Bayesian estimation for insufficient LNG system failure data; the risk values estimated
with these insufficient data may not show statistical stability or represent specific conditions
of an LNG facility.
The quantification of risk requires the quantification of the likelihood of rare accidental
events, which normally cannot be done without employing engineering judgment. In this
paper the relationship between characteristics and causes of accidents and system compo-
nents involved in hazardous offloading is analyzed about one type of consequence associ-
ated with the incident. This chapter presents a quantitative risk analysis based on Bayesian
techniques; the relation between the probability of occurrence of each hazardous event and
its consequence could be found; we have developed these concepts in [14]. The objective
this approach is providing safety for offloading operations in deepwater oil fields. We
consider both FPSO and shuttle as one integrated system. We present the application of
risk-based analysis techniques to evaluate offloading operations between a FPSO and a
shuttle tanker that could be used to develop actions and procedures to minimize the cons-
equences of an accident for the operation. The methodology presented can provide a model
in which reasoning is justified, while it enables a powerful marine decision-support
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solution that is simple to use, flexible, and appropriate for the risk assessment task. The
methodology with Bayesian approach as for decision support is presented in Section 2; we
presented the initials theoretically developed in [14], but we include it here again, for the
sake of clarity. In Section 3, the application example is presented, and finally, in Section 4
the results and final comments are presented.
2. Dynamic risk assessment methodology
Risk can be represented by Eq. (1) which relates the undesired event’s occurrence probability
and the consequences:
Risk ¼ pi; ci
 
Risk ¼ pi; ci
 
(1)
where pi is the ith event occurrence probability and ci is the effect of the ith event occu-
rrence [14].
For complex systems, the possibility that an unexpected scenario shows up is related to an
initial event or failure which happens in a specific component. For each one of the system’s or
subsystems’ components, it is necessary to know the probabilities that the unexpected condi-
tion (failure) shows up, and its consequences and states must be evaluated.
In this context, another important decision-making aspect in complex systems is the need for
creating a model which can consider dynamic characteristics of system. In the case under
analysis, these characteristics are given by the transition between states corresponding to safe
operating zones [15].
Hence, let ST be a variable that represents a state of system, and let K be a scenario. The
probability that K be true given the system is in the state ST can be represented by Eq. (2) [5]:
P KjSTð Þ ¼
P STjKð Þ∙P Kð Þ
P STð Þ
(2)
where P(ST|K) is the probability that the system was in the ST state given a scenario K, P(K) is
the probability that a scenario K be true, and P(ST) is the probability that the system is in the
state ST.
The method is based on probability risk assessment and Markovian process to aid decision-
making (see Figure 1). To calculate the probability of accident scenario, the Bayesian approach
is presented in detail in [5]. It is used to estimate the probabilities that the system is in each
state stochastic model are applied. This methodology allows, quantitatively, to assess the
consequences of the events of broad impact and to see relationship between the environment
changes and those impacts. The methodology can be summarized in four steps: accident
modeling, failure probability assessment with Bayesian techniques, evaluation of conse-
quences, and Markovian process to aid decision-making.
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2.1. Accident modeling
The first step identifies the objective of the risk assessment and to identify and to select the
undesirable consequences of interest. These consequences may include items like degrees of
harm to environment or degrees of loss of operation. This step covers relevant design and
operational information including operating emergency procedures.
In this same step, the hazard identification is based on techniques that allow, qualitatively, to
assess the consequences of the events of broad impact and to see the effects on the environ-
ment, personnel, and facilities. It requires the identification of the hazard event that is one or
more physical conditions with the potential to cause damaged. Aiming this stage is to depict
the consequences and to determine their causes, because the procedure is based on the selec-
tion of hazard events [16].
To determine the hazard events, “brainstorming” technique is used involving experienced
personnel as well as the procedures used for the practice of routine operations using a
question-answer technique based on preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) concepts. Apart from
human factors, failures of components installed in complex system are systematically consid-
ered by applying the methodology of failure modes and effect analysis, which usually starts
from identifying failure modes of each item composing the whole system. Based on informa-
tion about the system, interviews, and expert opinions, many hazards affecting the system are
identified [15].
Figure 1. Probabilistic risk assessment methodology.
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The accident modeling is finished with scenario modeling based on the use of the event tree.
An event tree is used to identify the various paths that the system could take, starting with the
initiating event and studying the failure progress as a series of successes or failures of interme-
diate events called hazard events, until an end state is reached. That sequence of events is
named failure scenario for which the consequences are estimated.
2.2. Failure probability assessment
In this step the failure probability of occurrence of a failure scenario is calculated combining
two conventional reliability analysis methods: fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree.
The probability of each failure scenario is determined by summing the probability of each set
of events which lead to this outcome. Each sequence probability is obtained by simply multi-
plying the probabilities of the events represented in each branch of the event tree in the case of
independence case; if there is dependence between events, the Bayesian methods are used. The
probabilities of the hazard event are obtained by solution of fault trees associated with each
hazard event. Fault tree analysis is a systematic, deductive, and probabilistic risk assessment
tool which clarifies the causal relations leading to a given undesired event. A fault tree is
quantified considering that its basic events tend to follow a probability distribution. The failure
probability of basic events is calculated using Bayesian methods.
2.2.1. Bayesian ideas and data analysis
The Bayesian techniques are appropriate for use in offshore offloading operation analysis
because the Bayesian statistical analysis involves the explicit use of subjective information
provided by the expert judgment, since initial uncertainty about unknown parameters of
failure distribution of basic events must be modeled from a priori expert opinion or based on
insufficient data and evidence collected. Bayes’ theorem has been proven to be a powerful
coherent method for probabilistically processing new data, as they become available over time,
so that the current posterior distribution can then be used as the prior distribution when the
next set of data becomes available.
The Bayesian method starts identifying the parameter to be estimated. This involves the
consideration of the form of the likelihood function appropriate to the evidence that will be
collected. The second step is development of prior probabilities to describe the system current
state of knowledge. The next step incorporates information through the collection of evidence
and construction of the likelihood function selected in the stage one. The final step results in
new probabilities using Bayes’ theorem, called posterior distribution, to describe your state of
knowledge after combining the prior probabilities with the evidence [17].
The selection of an appropriate likelihood function requires engineering knowledge specific to
the process being modeled, as well as the way the new data or evidences are generated. When
modeling the number of failures associated with a given piece of equipment, the Poisson distri-
bution is the proper likelihood function. While when modeling the number of failures on system
demands, the binomial distribution is the proper likelihood function. For data in form of expert
judgment, lognormal distribution is a proper likelihood function. For continuous data, for
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instance, time to failure, the exponential distribution is the proper likelihood [8]. However,
situations can arise where more complicated likelihood functions need to be constructed. Given
a process model, general approaches for developing functions of random variables can be used
to develop likelihood functions [18].
Prior distributions can be specified in different forms depending on the type and source of
information as well as the nature of the random variable of interest. The prior distributions can
be informative prior distributions when it is one that reflects the analyst’s beliefs concerning an
unknown parameter or noninformative prior distributions when large amounts of data are
available and when the analyst’s prior beliefs are relatively vague. This paper deals with
informative prior distributions deals. When it is assumed that the prior is a member of some
parametric family of distributions, the form can be parametric and numerical. Among the
parametric form are the gamma or lognormal for rates of events and beta for event probabil-
ities per demand. Bayesian statistics combines knowledge about the parameter, which is
reflected by the prior distribution, and information from the data, which is contained in the
likelihood function. Using Bayes’ theorem in its continuous form, the prior probability distri-
bution of a continuous unknown quantity, P0(x), can be updated to incorporate new evidence
E, as shown in Eq. (3):
P xjEð Þ ¼ L Ejxð Þ∙P0 xð ÞÐ
L Ejxð Þ∙P0 xð Þ∙dx (3)
where P(x|E) is the posterior probability distribution of the unknown quantity x given evi-
dence E and L(E|x) is the likelihood function.
For some combinations of likelihood functions and prior distributions, Eq. (3) must be
evaluated numerically. For a given model, there is a family of distributions where if the
prior distribution is a member of this family, then the posterior distribution will be a
member of the same family. These families of distribution are called conjugate distribution
[19]. The conjugate likelihood and prior are most commonly used in probability risk assess-
ment as well as the form of the resulting posterior distributions. These combinations are
shown in Table 1.
Prior P0(x) Likelihood L(E|x) Posterior P(x|E)
Beta (α,β)
Γ αþβð Þ
Γ αð Þ∙Γ βð Þ ∙x
α1
∙ 1 xð Þβ1
Binomial (r, n)
n!
r! nrð Þ! x
r 1 xð Þnr
Beta (α,β)
Γ αþβð Þ
Γ αð Þ∙Γ αð Þ ∙x
α1
∙ 1 xð Þβ1
Gamma (α,β)
xα1
Γ αð Þ e
β∙x
Poisson (x)
x∙tð Þr
r!
ex∙t
Gamma (α’ = α + r, β’ = β + t)
xα
01
Γ α0ð Þ e
β0 ∙x
Lognormal (μ,σ)
1ffiffiffiffiffi
2∙π
p
∙σ∙x
e
12
lnxμ
σð Þ
Poisson (x)
x∙tð Þr
r!
ex∙t
Numerical
Table 1. Typical prior and likelihood functions [19].
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2.3. Evaluation of consequences and making decision
The effects on the system attributable to hazardous event are defined, and Markovian process is
used tomodel the probability of changes during offloading operation that could cause changes in
the risk profile developed in step 2. The decision-making theory is used to evaluate the possibility
of emergency disconnection during the operation given the result of Markovian process.
Consequences of hazardous events or abnormal incidents on the shuttle tanker and offloading
operation are described and explained. A severity numerical scale is defined for hazardous
event classification. This scale was defined for three sets—safety of personal, facilities, and
environment—the first is related to the damages or the lesions that can be caused to the
employees and others, the second refers to damages in equipment or installations in shuttle
tanker or FPSO, and the third is associated with the damages on fauna, flora, and ecosystem.
That classification is presented in Table 2.
The risk is the combination between the failure probability and the severity magnitudes [20].
The decision-making part is related with accepting a certain risk scenario. The decision-
making theory is used to evaluate the possibility of emergency disconnection during the
operation. The risk is associated with an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a
negative effect on system operational condition.
2.4. Markovian process
The state of a deterministic dynamical system is some variable which fixes the value of all
present and future observables. Consequently, the present state determines the state at all
future. However, strictly deterministic systems are rather thin on the ground, so a natural
generalization is to say that the present state determines the distribution of future states.
Description Set
Personal Facilities Environment
Insignificant I No significant harm to people,
without removal of staff in the
interior of the installation
No significant harm to
installation
No significant harm to installation,
contamination of environment in
minimum concentration
Minor II Slight harm to people in
installation, no significant harm
to people outside installation
Minor damage or
degradation of the
installation, with repair at
low cost
Contamination of environment
below maximum concentration,
though concentration between
minimum and medium
Major III Serious harm to people in
installation and/or slight harm to
people outside installation
Major damage or degradation
of the installation, with
possible repair
Contamination of environment
below maximum concentration,
though concentration between
medium and maximum
Catastrophic IV Single fatality or multiple severe
harm to people inside and
outside of installation
Damage or degradation
without possible repair or
repair take a long time to do
Contamination of environment
above maximum concentration
Table 2. Relative severity criteria for hazardous event classification [15].
Probabilistic Modeling in System Engineering112
The probability of the system on “i state” is calculated as an approximate discrete model,
based on that for small steps (Δθ toward zero) with recurrent algorithm. Assumed two states,
the basic steps of the procedure are:
1. Declare initial variable counter k = 0, θk = 0, andθ end.
2. Declare probability distribution of the initial state. In this case it is assumed that
shuttle tank begins the offloading operation in operative zone: P1(θk = 0) = 1 and
P2(θk = 0) = 0.
3. Select time steps (Δθ).
4. Save tk, P1(θk), P2(θk), and increment counter: k = k + 1.
5. Calculate θk= θk-1+ Δθ.
6. Calculate state transition rates (pijk(θ)) for θ=(θk-1 + θk)/2.
7. Calculate transition matrix Mk for transition rates of step 4 using Eq. (5).
8. Calculate probability of the system state i at tk as:
9. P θkð Þ ¼ Mk∙P θk1ð Þ
3. Return to step 4: The procedure continues until t = tend
The Markovian process shows the probability that the position of shuttle tanker will change
from operational zone to alert zone in each environmental condition. That change affects the
decision of continuing the offloading operation. The decision-making theory can be used to
evaluate the need for disconnection in the case of occurrence of an environmental change
coupled to a critical component failure in the shuttle tanker.
4. Application of the methodology
The method is applied on the analysis of the offloading operation, when the crude oil is
transported to shore by shuttle tankers through an offloading arrangement with the use of
a shuttle tanker with dynamic positioning systems (DP). From the point of view of the
shuttle tanker, tandem offloading operation can in principle be summarized into the
following five operational stages [15]: (1) approach, tanker approaches FPSO and stops at
a predefined distance; (2) connection, messenger line, hawser, and loading hose are con-
nected; (3) loading, oil is transferred from FPSO to tanker; (4) disconnection, manifold is
flushed, and loading hose and hawser are disconnected; and (5) departure, tanker reverses
away from FPSO while sending back hawser messenger line and finally sails away from
oil field. In the first stage, the shuttle tanker approaches FPSO, at a maximum speed of 1.5
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knots, and this stage finishes when shuttle tanker stood 50–100 m behind the FPSO;
distance is considered appropriate to begin the connection stage. In the second stage, to
physically connect shuttle tanker and FPSO, some activities are executed, for example, the
messenger line crosses from one ship to the other allowing the mooring hawser and hose
to be connected. The tanker may position itself by its own dynamic positioning system so
that the hawser is not tensioned. As for safety reasons, a tug boat is also connected to the
ship stern acting as a redundant component to control hawser tension. In the third stage,
tests are realized, and the valves in vessels are open, and oil is transferred from FPSO to
tanker. During this stage, transfer rates are slow initially as the integrity of both vessel
systems are checked and gradually increased to a maximum transfer flow. When loading
is completed and stopped, the hose is flushed, and the valves are closed. Finally, the hose
is dropped and sends to FPSO the hose messenger line and the hawser. The shuttle tanker
moves off away FPSO (MCGA [21]).
Patino Rodriguez et al. [15] found 56 hazardous events for shuttle tank. The connection
stage is the phase with the highest number of hazardous event. In fact, this stage involves
more activities associated with mooring hawser and hose connection, besides the smallest
distance between shuttle tanker and FPSO. For all hazardous events, their causes were
identified, as well as the activities executed aiming at minimizing the occurrence of these
causes (mitigating scenarios). In a similar way, the consequences resulting from the haz-
ardous event are identified. Some of these are characterized as catastrophic. Most of them
are related to dynamic positioning system (DPS) failures. Considering that one of the most
important aspects in the offloading operation is to keep the position between FPSO and
shuttle tanker, the initiating event selected as for risk assessment is “DPS failure.” The
considered accident sequence is shown in Figure 2 modeled as an accident progression of
four hazard events: (1) auxiliary engine failure, (2) main engine failure, (3) tug failure, and
(4) towing cable failure.
The fault tree for the four hazard events that appears in the event tree was developed. For all
basic events of the four fault trees, the parameter to be estimated is failure rate, and the Poisson
distribution is selected as likelihood function. Poisson distribution is considered as appropriate
function given information available in database is the number of failures, r, in each time
interval, t, [22, 23]. Analyzing the type and source of information (expert judgment and
literature data) as well as the nature of the time to failure that is the random variable of
interest, gamma distribution is selected as appropriate “prior distribution.” The conjugate
family with respect to the risk model is shown in Table 1. Using Bayes’ theorem (Eq. 2) the
posteriori distribution is obtained:
Figure 2. Event sequence diagram of the accident progression for offloading operation.
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P λjEð Þ ¼
λ∙tð Þr
r!
∙eλ∙t
h i
∙
βα ∙λα1
Γ αð Þ ∙e
β∙λ
h i
Ð
∞
0
λ∙tð Þr
r!
∙eλ∙t
h i
∙
βα ∙λα1
Γ αð Þ ∙e
β∙λ
h i
∙dλ
)
P λjEð Þ ¼
βþ t
 αþr
∙λαþr1
Γ αþ rð Þ
" #
∙e
 βþtð Þ∙λ (4)
As an example, the posterior distribution is calculating for fuel system failure (see Figure 3)
one component of main engine.
Aiming to obtain the probability that K be true given the system is in the state ST represented
by Eq. (2), it is necessary to estimate the posterior mean value of failure rate. To calculate the
failure probability of hazard events, we use fault tree analysis. Then for all basic events of the
fault trees, the failure probability was determined using Bayesian inference. The posterior
distribution is calculated, using the conjugate distribution. By analyzing the type of informa-
tion availability, the Gamma distribution is selected as appropriate prior distribution, and
Poisson distribution is selected as likelihood function. We calculate substituting in Eq. (4) the
failure rates for fuel system failure (see Table 3). The prior distribution was estimated using
databases that recorded the rate failure to equipment used in offshore industry.
The calculated probabilities for the basic events are used as input to a fault tree to determine
the probability of the event hazard: “no fuel flow.”Using probability theory and assuming that
the fuel system is operated for t = 43,800 h (time between maintenance), the probability of “no
Figure 3. Fault tree for fuel system failure.
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fuel flow” is 8.390E-04. The prior and posterior density of basic event that has more influence
on system failure is shown in Figure 4, associated with the failure of the centrifugal pump. A
90% interval estimate for failure rate is found by computing the 5th and 95th percentiles of
gamma distribution, and the interval is between 2,96E-04 and 5,08E-04.
The same procedure is used for other subsystems, and the probability of hazard event “main
engine failure” is found by solving the fault tree associated with that failure. In the same way,
that procedure is applied to find the probability of all hazard events as shown in Table 4.
Connected to the hazard event, the operation involves risks related to collisions during the
offshore operation as presented in Figure 2. The event tree in Figure 5 is the failure scenario
development associated with the failure in DPS, considering the probabilities presented in
Table 4.
The proposed method for risk assessment seems to be suitable for complex systems analysis,
since it not only allows for the identification of critical consequences, but it is also a tool to
make decisions, because it enables a quantitative evaluation of accident progression in systems
that change their operational condition throughout time.
The sequence of abnormal events is determined, and the consequences are estimated using the
event tree. The initiating event selected is the shuttle tanker change from operational zone to
alert zone. The accident sequence considered is modeled as an accident progression of five
hazard events, and we have four consequence categories. The fault tree for the five hazard
events was developed as shown in Figure 5. The shuttle tanker is loss of position in powered
condition, and its subsequent collision with the FPSO is the most significant risk.
Equipment E[P0(λ)]
[failure/h]
ST[P0(λ)]
[failure/h]
P(λ|E)
[failure/h]
Equipment E[P0(λ)]
[failure/h]
ST[P0(λ)]
[failure/h]
P[λ|E]
[failure/h]
Booster pump 1.10E-03 1.10E-03 2.24E-05 Fuel pumps 1.43E-03 1.13E-03 3.55E-05
Bypass valve 2.28E-05 1.50E-05 1.59E-05 Heater 4.54E-05 3.74E-05 1.93E-05
Centrifugal pump 7.36E-04 1.20E-04 3.95E-04 Main tank 2.13E-04 2.13E-04 2.06E-05
Centrifuge 1.69E-05 5.94E-06 1.55E-05 Mixing tank 9.50E-06 9.11E-06 6.87E-06
Check valve 3.60E-07 5.10E-07 3.49E-07 Piping: blockage 3.70E-07 6.18E-07 3.54E-07
Daily service tank 9.50E-06 9.11E-06 6.87E-06 Piping: breakage 4.40E-07 9.57E-07 4.03E-07
Fuel pump control shaft 3.00E-05 3.00E-05 1.30E-05 Pressure regul.
Valve
8.81E-06 1.25E-05 4.98E-06
Engine centrif. Pump 1.13E-04 2.81E-05 8.62E-05 Settling 4.37E-04 6.26E-04 1.08E-05
Filter heated 2.00E-06 2.00E-06 1.84E-06 Settling tank 6.26E-05 1.12E-04 6.43E-06
Flow meter 1.32E-05 3.26E-06 1.27E-05 Three-way valve 2.28E-05 1.50E-05 1.59E-05
Fuel injector: blockage 7.24E-06 1.02E-05 4.43E-06 Transfer pump 7.36E-04 1.20E-04 3.95E-04
Fuel injector: breakage 2.00E-07 2.00E-07 1.98E-07 Viscosity regulator 6.39E-06 8.96E-06 4.12E-06
Fuel Pumps 1.43E-03 1.13E-03 3.55E-05 VIT system 2.06E-07 2.06E-07 2.04E-07
Table 3. Failure rates and standard deviations of the basic events of fault tree for fuel system failure.
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The failure scenario presented in Figure 5 can occur at any time during offloading operation. The
position of the tanker in relation to FPSO during offloading is controlled. In case it reaches the
alert zone, as shown in Figure 6, the tanker can be disconnected and the offloading is aborted. So
the consequence of the failures considered in the study can be more severe depending of the
relative position of the tanker.
It is essential to consider the probability of the change of the shuttle tanker position from
operational zone to alert zone, as shown in Figure 6, during offloading. The distribution
parameters are estimated using a simulator that reproduces ship motions in a specific opera-
tion condition and environmental condition. We used these conditions of waves, wind, and
currents.
After finding the failure probability of all hazard events, the failure probability for scenar-
ios is calculated by multiplying hazard events. The probability of each consequence
Figure 4. The prior density and posterior density for centrifugal pump failure rate.
Hazard event P(λ|E) [failure/h] 90% interval estimate for rate failure
5% 95%
Dynamic positioning system (DPS) failure 1.58E-05 3.18E-07 5.29E-05
Auxiliary engine failure 1.97E-04 1.01E-04 3.18E-04
Main engine 4.95E-05 9.70E-06 1.14E-04
Tug failure 2.28E-05 1.17E-06 6.82E-05
Towing cable failure 2.18E-03 0.001837 0.002555
Table 4. Posterior probabilities for hazard events involved in the offloading operation and a 90% interval estimate for
failure rate.
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category is calculated by adding the probabilities of the scenarios with the same conse-
quence category. The random variable that corresponds to the angle between the FPSO
and shuttle tanker during offloading operation is modeled as Weibull distribution. Accor-
ding to the standards of the offloading operation in Brazil, the angle in the operational
zone should not be greater than 45 degrees; as a result of these conditions, the parameter
of four consequence categories was estimated, and the equation for transition rate is
determined. Let us consider the two states established before: operational zone and alarm
zone.
The transition rates between states are not constant; then the stochastic process can be modeled
as semi-Markov process which shows the probability of the position of the shuttle tanker
changing from operational zone to alert zone in a given environmental condition.
By applying the results obtained from the simulation, Markovian analysis, and event tree, the
probability that a K scenario is true is obtained, given the system is in the ST state.
In Eq. (5) we define a K  K state transition probability matrix Mk.
Figure 5. Event tree for the offloading operation.
Figure 6. Markov state transition diagram.
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Mk ¼
1 p12k∙∆θ p21k∙∆θ
p12k∙∆θ 1 p21k∙∆θ
 
(5)
where pij(θ)Δθ is the probability of the system, which is operational zone at position θ, will
come alert zone in the interval (θ, θ+Δθ).
The state transition rates correspond to the following event rates: the shuttle tanker gets out of
the operational zone, and the shuttle tank gets into the operational zone. In each state (ST)
there are a number of possible events that can cause a transition. A ship dynamics simulator
that determines ship maneuvering characteristics was used to calculate the transition. The
simulator can accurately reproduce ship motion in the presence of waves, wind, and currents.
Table 5 shows typical environmental conditions in the fall and in the spring for Campos Basin
(Brazil). Hence, with the program outputs, it was possible to calculate the angle between FPSO
and shuttle tanker at any moment during the offloading operation.
According to the standards of the offloading operation in Brazil, this angle within the opera-
tional zone should not be greater than 45 degrees. Weibull probability functions were found as
proper distributions to represent the angle between FPSO and shuttle tanker during the
offloading operation both inside and outside the operational zone. The parameters and transi-
tion rate equation are shown in Table 6.
Then, using the recurrent algorithm shown in the section of Markovian process, the probability
(P(ST)) that the shuttle tanker is inside the operational zone, without any failure, is 0.7918. In
the same way, inducing the hazard events in ship dynamics simulator is possible to simulate
the consequence categories and to determine the probability that the system was in the ST state
given a scenario K as shown in Table 7.
Applying Eq. (2) the probability that a scenario K is true given the system is in the state ST is
obtained. For instance, the probability that shuttle tanker is without main propulsion, making
Current [m/s] Wind [m/s] Wave [m]
0.71 S 11.16 SE 2.9 SE
Table 5. Environmental conditions.
State Parameter Weibull distribution Transition
rate equation
Consequence category
0 C B A
Inside the operational zone β = 1.641;
η = 12.97
β = 1.596;
η = 13.05
β = 1.473;
η = 12.01
β = 1.691;
η = 14.34
β
η ∙
θk
η
 β1
Outside the operational zone β = 10.99;
η = 30.07
β = 8.604;
η = 60.51
β = 8.499;
η = 60.40
β = 7.259;
η = 63.21
Table 6. Parameters and transition rate for offloading operation.
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possible the collision between the shuttle tanker and the FPSO, given that shuttle tanker is in
the inside the operational zone is
P K ¼ CjST ¼ 1ð Þ ¼
0:1954ð Þ∙ 0:43ð Þ
0:7918
¼ 0:1059
5. Conclusion
The tandem offloading operation is a complex and difficult marine operation. It may range
from once every 3 to 5 days, depending on the production rate, storage capacity of FPSO, and
shuttle tanker size. The duration of the operation takes about 24 hours based on FPSO storage
capacity and oil transfer rate. Meanwhile, a suitable environmental condition is required.
Shuttle tanker loss of position in powered condition and subsequently collision with FPSO is
the most significant risk.
The proposed method for risk assessment seems to be suitable for complex systems since it
allows not only the identification of critical consequences to analyze this kind system but also
is a tool to make decision because it allows a quantitative evaluation of accident progression in
system that change its operational condition during the time.
The development of the fault tree and event tree is important for the understanding of the
functional relation between system components and the relationship with accident progres-
sion. Based on the modeling of each accident scenario, the Bayesian analysis is performed
considering the evidence of database and knowledge of offloading operation. The objective of
Bayesian estimation was to develop a posterior distribution for a set of uncertain parameters
allowing estimating a probability for several consequence categories as an integral part of
current theories on decision-making under uncertainty.
Based on results of a ship dynamics simulator, the method allows to carry out the probability
that the shuttle tanker was in a given position, indicating the variation of the position of the
tanker in relation to the FPSO due to environmental conditions.
For the case under analysis, which considered the position between FPSO and shuttle tanker
during offloading operation, defined by two operational states, the probability that a failure
scenario is true given the system is in a specific operational state is obtained. Both states have
the distribution of positions represented by a Weibull probability function.
State Consequence category
P(ST) P(K = C) P(K = B) P(K = A)
Inside the operational zone 0.7918 0.19546 0.039312 0.03528
Outside the operational zone 0.2082 0.80454 0.96069 0.96472
Table 7. Probabilities that the tanker is inside a given location each for each consequence category.
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The method is a proactive methodology to prevent accidents through risk assessment aiming
at identifying and depicting a system, to reduce failures and to minimize consequences of the
hazardous events. The results of the analysis support the development of mitigating scenarios
for the causes of hazardous events and contingency scenarios for the consequences of hazard-
ous events.
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